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SAY CHEESE: HOW THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FAILS TO 
PROTECT YOUR FACE 
Antonio Vayas* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From photographs and fingerprints to facial recognition, 
technology has changed the tools available to law enforcement.1  Police 
officers can now run an arrested individual’s DNA to determine if it 
matches with DNA found in a previously unsolved case.2  As the 
complexity of everyday technology grows (i.e., a new smartphone 
coming out every year), so too does the difficulty of defining the proper 
limits of law enforcement’s power to use information generated by 
more complex technology.  This Comment addresses one development 
in particular—the availability of biometric technology on mobile 
devices.   
Opening a smartphone used to require inputting a passcode or 
password.3  But on both the iPhone and the Samsung Galaxy, the two 
most widely owned phones on the market,4 there are now two 
additional, more popular, ways to open a phone.  One can open his or 
her phone using a fingerprint,5 or a face scan using the dimensions of his 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2017, New York 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Brian Murray and my Comments Editor, Alex 
Corson, for their constant help and guidance throughout this writing process.  Further, 
I thank Luke Dodge, Avi Muller, and all of the members of the Seton Hall Law Review for 
their help throughout this editing process. 
 1 See Jeffrey Dastin, California Legislature Bars Facial Recognition for Police Body 
Cameras, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-
facial-recognition/california-legislature-bars-facial-recognition-for-police-body-
cameras-idUSKCN1VX2ZP. 
 2 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (upholding a buccal swab 
administrative scheme). 
 3 See, e.g., Dave Johnson, How to Lock Your iPhone with a Passcode, BUS. INSIDER (May 
14, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-lock-iphone. 
 4 See Sudarshan, Most Shipped Smartphones in 2020: iPhone 11, Galaxy A51, Redmi 
Note 9 Pro & More, GIZMOCHINA (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.gizmochina.com/2021/
02/25/most-shipped-smartphones-2020-omdia. 
 5 See, e.g., iPhone SE, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-se/specs/ (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2021); Galaxy S10, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/mobile/galaxy-
s10/design (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
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or her face.6  The phone then saves and stores this biometric 
information.7   
Indeed, a person’s phone is no longer just a contact book and a 
device to make calls.  Now, it is also a repository of a person’s intimate 
information—including emails, photos, and even essential documents.  
This development led to decisions, such as Riley v. California8 and 
Carpenter v. United States,9 wherein the Supreme Court held that the 
increase in intimate information contained in a phone, similar to that 
found on a computer, made warrantless searches of phones 
unconstitutional absent particular circumstances.10  The Supreme 
Court’s stance in the two opinions, both authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts, that mobile devices deserve increased protection has led to a 
dispute over the extent to which a suspect’s phone and its contents are 
legally protected.11   
Riley touches upon certain aspects of this dispute.12  But Riley’s 
holding was narrow, only covering a specific exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.13  So while the Court emphasized a need for additional 
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment,14 the extent and 
scope of said protections appear to be mostly lip service.  Subsequently, 
in Carpenter, the Court reiterated much of Riley’s rhetoric and analysis.15  
But neither opinion provided a clear framework to the inclusion and 
compulsion of biometric features, except for the broad stroke analysis 
that phones should have some form of increased protection.  
 
 6 iPhone 11, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-11/specs/ (last visited Mar. 21, 
2021); Use Facial Recognition Security on Your Galaxy Phone, SAMSUNG, 
https://www.samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS00062630 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2021).  
 7 Curtis Moldrich, What Is Apples Touch ID and How Does It Work, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 
16, 2014, 4:19 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/11167454/What-
is-Apples-Touch-ID-and-how-does-it-work.html.  
 8 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 9 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 10 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.  A more thorough explanation of Riley and its impact 
appears below.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 11 See id. at 378; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.  The composition of the Court changed 
from Riley to Carpenter, as Justice Scalia passed and Justice Gorsuch filled his seat. 
 12 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–03 (holding that the officer’s warrantless search was 
invalid). 
 13 Id. at 402 (regarding the context of a warrantless search and the search incident 
to a lawful arrest exception). 
 14 Id. at 395 (“[T]here is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones 
but not physical records. . . . Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine 
basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two[.]”). 
 15 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385) (“[C]ell phones and 
the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that 
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”). 
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Consequently, lower courts have looked to the Fifth Amendment as a 
possible source of a resolution.16  Further, state supreme courts have 
begun weighing in, creating a 2-2 split as to what protections the Fifth 
Amendment provides.17  Courts have not come to a consensus on what 
protections the Fourth and Fifth Amendments afford defendants when 
law enforcement seeks to compel the production of encrypted or 
biometric information.18  In short, the situation is a mess.19 
This Comment addresses whether a person can be compelled in a 
search warrant or court order to open their phone using their biometric 
information, and how courts are analyzing this question under both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  Further, it posits that a court’s use of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause to answer this question is 
improper and undermines the Fourth Amendment’s purpose.  Part II of 
this Comment describes the purpose and history of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.  Part III discusses the technology used for biometrics and 
how law enforcement has used this technology.  Part IV then discusses 
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding 
technology in Riley and Carpenter and how these cases may suggest the 
Supreme Court’s direction on these issues.  Then, it provides a brief 
overview of the recent state supreme court split on compelled biometric 
information and some scholarship surrounding the issue.  Part V 
discusses the implications of state supreme and lower federal courts’ 
respective applications of relevant case law and the issues at stake.  This 
Comment concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to provide a 
clearer framework has led to confusion and inconsistency.  Analyzing 
the inclusion of a person’s biometric features in a search warrant 
ultimately invokes privacy considerations, and the Fifth Amendment is 
ill-suited for the analysis.  But in the absence of guidance from the 
Supreme Court, courts should adhere to the warnings provided in Riley 
 
 16 See, e.g., United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d. 832, 838–42 (N.D. Ill. 2019) 
(applying the Fifth Amendment to uphold a search warrant compelling the use of a 
person’s biometric information); United States v. Maffei, No. 18-CR-00175, 2019 WL 
1864712, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019) (same).   
 17 State v. Pittman, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. 2021); State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. 
2020); Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. 2020); Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 
(Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. 2019).   
 18 Compare Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d. at 842 (upholding a search warrant that 
compelled the use of a person’s biometric information relying on the Fifth Amendment), 
with United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188 (D. Nev. 2020) (holding a 
warrant that compelled a person’s biometric features violated the Fifth Amendment).   
 19 Orin Kerr, The Law of Compelled Decryption is a Mess: A Dialogue, REASON (Aug. 10, 
2020, 11:36 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, A Dialogue], https://reason.com/volokh/2020/08/
10/the-law-of-compelled-decryption-is-a-mess-a-dialogue (writing that the New 
Jersey’s recent decision in State v. Andrews left him “unable to say what the law is”). 
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and Carpenter and treat technology, and in turn, biometric information, 
with heightened protection.   
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION 
A.  Fourth Amendment: Origins and Purpose 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to curb government 
intrusion and protect citizens’ privacy.  The Fourth Amendment states 
that people have the right 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.20 
At a bare minimum, the Fourth Amendment maintains that citizens have 
the right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures.21  
As for warrants, the text dictates that searches and seizures must be 
justified by probable cause and not be generalized, but rather 
particularized as to what is to be searched.22  Some have interpreted the 
Warrants Clause, and the Fourth Amendment as a whole, to limit the 
power of police to search persons or places.23  But determining the exact 
scope of the Fourth Amendment is a tricky task.24 
The Fourth Amendment grew out of the American Colonies’ 
aversion to British search and seizure practices, primarily with British 
use of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants.”25  Before the Bill of 
Rights, many state constitutions viewed the warrant “as an enemy, not 
a friend.”26  This outright hatred of the warrant led to a series of 
challenges with the common theme of protecting citizens from 
“arbitrary government intrusion” and preventing government abuse of 
 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Blane Michael, Madison Lecture: Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance 
from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 921–22 (2010). 
 24 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 
(1994) (calling today’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “an embarrassment”). 
 25 Michael, supra note 23, at 907–09.  A writ of assistance allowed an officer to 
“search any place on nothing more than his own (subjective) suspicion.”  Id. at 907–08.  
While a general warrant similarly allowed officers “to search unspecified places or to 
seize unspecified persons.”  Id. at 909.   
 26 Amar, supra note 24, at 774 (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969)).  
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this power.27  But these challenges ultimately failed, and, as a result, the 
combined effect of the failed challenges gave officers carte blanche to 
search persons or places.28   
Thus, the Framers established the Fourth Amendment with two 
vital protections: (1) freedom from unreasonable searches and (2) a 
requirement that any warrant must be supported by probable cause, 
oath or affirmation, and properly particularized to what is being 
searched.29  Yet, judges and scholars have conflicting opinions on 
whether the Fourth Amendment establishes two separate protections 
(unreasonable search protection and warrant protection) or one 
general protection (where the absence of a warrant generally creates an 
unreasonable search).30   
Professor Akhil Amar explains that the framers intentionally 
separated the Reasonableness and Warrants Clauses to delineate the 
proper analysis of police searches.31  Professor Amar posits that the 
Fourth Amendment makes clear that warrants are not the measure of a 
proper search; the proper question is whether the search is 
reasonable.32  Therefore, even if there is a “valid” warrant, it is still 
unlawful “if the underlying search or seizure it would authorize would 
be unreasonable.”33  The Framers included this limit to prevent any 
potential abuses from judges issuing warrants, who are ultimately a part 
of the government that the Fourth Amendment serves to check 
against.34  The Warrant Clause only stipulates when a warrant is 
appropriately issued—not that the presence of a warrant establishes 
the search is presumptively reasonable, as some suggest.35 
Thus, the “judge” of a reasonable search needs to be a jury, so a 
genuinely independent body steers the inquiry.36  Revolution-era judges 
viewed warrants as indemnifying the searcher, not serving as a 
protection for a searched citizen, which further supports this 
 
 27 Michael, supra note 23, at 909–11. 
 28 See id. at 910–11. 
 29 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 30 Compare Amar, supra note 24, at 762–70 (arguing that the absence of a warrant 
during a search is not per se unreasonable, despite the Supreme Court insistence that 
there is a warrant requirement), with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390–91 (1978) 
(evaluating a search’s reasonableness by asking first if the Government satisfied the 
warrant requirement), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) 
(same).   
 31 See Amar, supra note 24, at 775, 782. 
 32 Id. at 801. 
 33 Id. at 774. 
 34 Id. at 773. 
 35 Id. at 774. 
 36 Id. 
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proposition.37  And jury determinations of reasonableness ensured 
proper judicial review of any search because the standard of review was 
less deferential than a question of whether there was probable cause for 
a warrant, as determined by a judge.38 
But, in practice, the Supreme Court has approached the two clauses 
as connected with the presence of a valid warrant insulating the 
search.39  As such, Professor Amar’s history of the Fourth Amendment 
may serve as more of an alternative theory.  It remains notable because 
it shows that, when evaluating a search, any inquiry ultimately comes 
down to the reasonableness of the search.40   
B.  The Fifth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause’s Origins 
and Purpose41 
At first blush, it may seem odd to discuss the Fifth Amendment 
when the focus of this Comment is the Fourth Amendment.  But often, 
evaluating a Fourth Amendment challenge implicates an analysis of the 
Fifth Amendment; therefore, it is necessary to discuss the origin of the 
Fifth Amendment as well.42  Similar to the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment derives from the Framers’ unwillingness to grant law 
enforcement unrestrained powers to prosecute defendants.43   
The Self-Incrimination Clause states, “No person . . . shall be 
compelled to be a witness against himself.”44  Commentators differ as to 
where exactly the purpose of this clause originates; some claim that it 
was a product of an “outgrowth of the epochal change in criminal 
procedure . . . as defense counsel entered the criminal courts,”45 while 
others suggest it was a result of the convergence of competing criminal 
procedural considerations.46  As a result, “the Fifth Amendment is an 
 
 37 See Amar, supra note 24, at 779. 
 38 See id. at 774. 
 39 See JOHN KIP CORNWELL, THE GLANNON GUIDE TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 69 (Wolters 
Kluwer ed., 4th ed. 2019) (“Generally speaking, unless an exception applies . . . police 
officers need a warrant[.]”). 
 40 See Amar, supra note 24, at 774.  
 41 For purposes of this Comment, there will only be a brief overview of the history 
of this Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
 42 See Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1858–59 (2005); see also In re Search of a 
Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (applying both Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment analyses). 
 43 See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1994).   
 44 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 45 See Moglen, supra note 43, at 1088. 
 46 See id.   
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unsolved riddle of vast proportions.”47  Regardless of its precise origin, 
it is clear that Americans recognized limits on prosecutorial power, 
including preventing testimony through coercion.48   
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
is a “protection against the prosecutor’s use of incriminating 
information derived directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony 
[of a suspect].”49  This protection is a reflection of the country’s 
“‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt’ that defined the 
operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose 
between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking their 
oath by committing perjury.”50  While the purpose of the Self-
Incrimination Clause may be somewhat unclear, the practical 
protections evince an intent to limit prosecutorial power.   
The Supreme Court has held that there are three elements of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause’s protection: compulsion, incrimination, and 
testimony.51  Compulsion has a malleable definition, but generally 
prohibits someone from serving as a witness against himself and the 
“extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our 
sense of justice.”52  Incrimination refers to information that would 
expose an individual to a criminal charge.53  Testimony is a more 
complicated issue, especially considering the growth of technology and 
how the types of information have continually changed.  But Supreme 
Court precedent refers to testimony as “diclos[ing] the contents of [the 
criminal defendant’s] own mind.”54  Justice Holmes explained that this 
protection means there is a “prohibition of the use of . . . compulsion to 
extort communications from [the witness], not an exclusion of his body 
as evidence.”55   
  
 
 47 Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995). 
 48 Moglen, supra note 43, at 1118. 
 49 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000). 
 50 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (quoting Doe v. United States, 
487 U.S. 201, 212 (1998)). 
 51 Caren Myers Morrison, The Intersection of Facebook and the Law: Symposium 
Article: Passwords, Profiles, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Facebook and the 
Fifth Amendment, 65 ARK. L. REV. 133, 144 (2012). 
 52 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973). 
 53 Morrison, supra note 51, at 144. 
 54 Id. at 145 n.48. 
 55 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910). 
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Taken together, the Self-Incrimination Clause can serve as a 
powerful barrier to admitting certain statements from a suspect.  
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment demonstrates the American 
people’s hesitance in granting law enforcement broad powers.  History 
shows that as technology develops and the number of tools available to 
law enforcement increases, a need arises to reconsider these 
constitutional protections. 
III.  TECHNOLOGY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Technology has had a profound impact on the protections afforded 
to Americans in the context of an arrest.  When James Madison proposed 
the Bill of Rights, the technology available to police officers would have 
been inconceivable.  This is why, as our reliance on technology has 
increased, personal privacy has become an increasingly vital concern.56  
This is especially true in the wake of something like the Facebook-
Cambridge Analytica scandal.57  The fallout from the scandal 
demonstrates the increased pressure on companies to guarantee that 
information is not freely accessed without the proper protections.58  
Thus, considering the profoundly intimate information on a person’s 
phone, users benefit from the smartphones’ privacy protections.  This 
Part sets forth the current biometric protections in smartphones and 
provides some modern examples of the privacy implications at play to 
establish this issue’s precarious nature.   
A.  Smartphones and the Evolution of Passcodes 
Passcodes used to open a smartphone are generally four- or six-
digit numerical personal identification numbers (PINs) or alphabetical 
codes.59  But these security measures do not provide absolute protection 
 
 56 See, e.g., Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Dec. 22, 
2020) (“Privacy is a fundamental human right.”); Rebecca Heilwell, Jeff Merkley and 
Bernie Sanders Have a Plan to Protect You from Facial Recognition, VOX (Aug. 4, 2020, 
2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/8/4/21354053/bernie-sanders-jeff-
merkley-national-biometric-information-privacy-act (the proposed act “would require 
private companies and corporations to get written consent from people in order to 
collect their biometric data”).  
 57 See generally Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The 
Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.  In 2018, the New 
York Times and other news outlets discovered a data breach of millions of Facebook 
users whose information was harvested and then sold by the former political consulting 
firm, Cambridge Analytica.  Id.  
 58 See id. 
 59 See Smart Phone Thefts Rose to 3.1 Million in 2013, CONSUMER REPS. (May 28, 2014, 
4:00 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-
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to the information in the device, as both four-digit and six-digit PINs can 
be hacked within a matter of hours.60  Therefore, it is logical for 
smartphone users to recognize that their information is potentially 
vulnerable and be increasingly conscious of protecting their phones.  
This awareness helps explain the implementation of stricter measures 
to protect phones, such as biometric passcodes. 
Biometrics are unique biological characteristics used to “verif[y] 
the identity of a human being.”61  They are increasingly replacing PINs, 
which are less secure.62  A smartphone using a biometric passcode 
should only open for the phone’s actual owner after verifying the 
physical feature registered with the phone.63  Apple popularized 
biometric passwords in 2013 when Apple released its iPhone 5s.64  
Apple equipped the phone with “Touch ID,” which allowed users to 
unlock their phones with a fingerprint.65  Touch ID allowed users to have 
a more secure passcode than the traditional four or six-digit PIN, with 
the added convenience of just touching a button.66  Fingerprints are 
unique to each person, and they are more unique than a person’s DNA.67  
Theoretically, this ensures that a person’s phone can only be opened by 
their unique touch.   
  
 
rose-to-3-1-million-last-year/index.htm (observing that the most commonly used 
passcode was a four-digit PIN). 
 60 See, e.g., Robert Hackett, How Long It Takes to Break a Passcode, FORTUNE (Mar. 18, 
2016, 4:50 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/apple-fbi-iphone-passcode-hack 
(showing the average times to hack alphabetical or numerical passcodes).  
 61 Colin Soutar et al., Biometric Encryption, in ISCA GUIDE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 650 
(Randall K. Nichols ed., 1999), http://www.cse.lehigh.edu/prr/Biometrics/Archive/
Papers/BiometricEncryption.pdf. 
 62 See Heather Kelly, 5 Biometric Alternatives to the Password, CNN (Apr. 4, 2014, 
5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/04/tech/innovation/5-biometrics-future. 
 63 See, e.g., About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/
en-us/HT208108 (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (explaining the Face ID system). 
 64 See Press Release, APPLE, Apple Announces iPhone 5s—The Most Forward-Thinking 
Smartphone in the World (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.apple.com/newsroom/2013/
09/10Apple-Announces-iPhone-5s-The-Most-Forward-Thinking-Smartphone-in-the-
World. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Khidr Suleman, How Secure Is Apple’s Touch ID?, IT PRO (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.itpro.co.uk/mobile/20728/how-secure-apples-touch-id.  An identical set 
of fingerprints has yet to be discovered.  Anahad O’Connor, The Claim: Identical Twins 
Have Identical Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/
11/02/health/the-claim-identical-twins-have-identical-fingerprints.html. 
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But biometric passcodes did not stop at fingerprints, as Apple 
released their iPhone X in 2017 and introduced “Face ID.”68  This 
allowed users to save the dimensions of their faces to unlock their 
phones.69  This creates a three-dimensional scan to compare a user’s 
face and unlock the phone.70  This technology is so advanced that 
between Face ID and Touch ID (and other brands’ equivalent features), 
it is near impossible to unlock a phone without the proper scan.71   
B.  Abuses of Facial Recognition Technology and Privacy Issues at 
Stake 
Despite the rapid development of technology and the public’s 
excitement over the convenience it brings, a concern arises when law 
enforcement uses technology for policing.  For example, California 
legislators recently struck down a law that allowed police departments 
to use facial recognition software in body cameras worn by police 
officers.72  Legislators were concerned over citizens’ privacy and that 
the technology available was not reliable enough.73  This concern over 
privacy in the digital age has led to a more critical eye from the general 
public on private companies and users’ information.74   
  
 
 68 Press Release, APPLE, The Future is Here: iPhone X (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2017/09/the-future-is-here-iphone-x.  
 69 See Andy Greenberg, How Secure is the iPhone X’s FaceID? Here’s What We Know, 
WIRED (Sept. 12, 2017, 5:08 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/iphone-x-faceid-
security.  
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Rachel Metz, California Lawmakers Ban Facial-Recognition Software from Police 
Body Cams, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/tech/california-body-cam-facial-
recognition-ban/index.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2019). 
 73 Id. (“Studies have shown, for instance, that the technology is worse at accurately 
identifying women and people of color.”).  This article may be underselling the 
inaccuracies, as the Detroit Police Chief recently announced the recognition software 
misidentifies someone 96% of the time.  Jason Koebler, Detroit Police Chief: Facial 
Recognition Software Misidentifies 96% of the Time, VICE (June 29, 2020, 12:56 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dyzykz/detroit-police-chief-facial-recognition-
software-misidentifies-96-of-the-time. 
 74 Notably, Senator Jeff Merkley and Senator Bernie Sanders have proposed a bill to 
regulate the biometric information companies can collect from their consumers.  
Rebecca Heilweil, Jeff Merkley and Bernie Sanders Have a Plan to Protect You From Facial 
Recognition, VOX (Aug. 4, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/8/4/
21354053/bernie-sanders-jeff-merkley-national-biometric-information-privacy-act.  
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Examples of the abuses of facial recognition technology have led to 
a variety of consequences.  China, which is among the world’s leaders in 
monitoring its citizens,75 recently required anyone who registers a 
mobile phone to submit to facial scans.76  The justification for this 
increased surveillance and use of technology is similar to that in the 
United States—better protecting its citizens.77  In Xinjiang, home to 
China’s internment camps for the Uighar Muslim population, there are 
cameras and police checkpoints about every 150 feet.78  Chinese police 
use these cameras to monitor citizens, cross-reference their faces, and 
search citizens’ phones.79  The goal is to help Chinese police find Uighurs 
who practice their faith and then send them to reeducation camps.80  
Despite the potential “benefits,” the dangers of this type of surveillance 
state are clear.   
Even in less extreme examples, justifying a surveillance system 
(even in a limited capacity) to protect citizens can lead to drastic 
consequences.  In 2019, New Jersey police officers arrested Nijeer Parks 
for “shoplifting candy and trying to hit a police officer with a car.”81  
Police identified Mr. Parks solely using facial recognition technology, 
despite him being thirty miles away from the crime scene.82  Mr. Parks 
was held in jail for ten days, and eventually all charges were dismissed 
for lack of evidence.83  Law enforcement often justifies their use of facial 
recognition technology by claiming that the technology was just another 
tool used in the larger investigation.84  In practice, however, a match in 
 
 75 Paul Bischoff, Surveillance Camera Statistics: Which Cities Have the Most CCTV 
Cameras?, COMPARITECH, https://www.comparitech.com/vpn-privacy/the-worlds-most-
surveilled-cities (last updated July 22, 2020). 
 76 James Griffiths, China is Rolling Out Facial Recognition for All New Mobile Phone 
Numbers, CNN (Dec. 2, 2019 4:52 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/02/tech/china-
facial-recognition-mobile-intl-hnk-scli/index.html. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Matt Rivers & Lily Lee, Security Cameras and Barbed Wire: Living Amid Fear and 
Oppression in Xinjiang, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/asia/uyghur-
xinjiang-china-kashgar-intl/index.html (last updated May 9, 2019, 6:48 PM). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a 
Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/
technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html. 
 81 Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-
recognition-misidentify-jail.html. 
 82 See id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. (“[I]t is used only as a clue in a case and will not lead directly to an arrest.”).  
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the software can be the only evidence to link a suspect to a crime and 
lead to false arrests.85   
Despite these overwhelming privacy concerns, courts still have 
often deferred to law enforcement and the benefits of technology.  As 
discussed below, Supreme Court precedent and lower courts’ treatment 
of technology and access to biometric information demonstrate this 
deference.   
IV.  LEGAL PRECEDENT AND BIOMETRIC INFORMATION 
Federal appellate litigation concerning biometrics and 
constitutional protections has been sparse; however, in a recent line of 
Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has given some indication 
on how technology and privacy protections interact and the type of 
framework it could use for analysis.  But despite some lofty declarations 
from the Supreme Court, there remains some doubt as to the Fourth 
Amendment adequacy in protecting a person’s face or other features, if 
included in a search warrant.  Consequently, courts have looked to the 
Fifth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause as a means of 
protection.  This Part focuses on this recent case law and attempts to 
delineate the principles guiding the Supreme Court’s opinions through 
its recent opinions concerning cell phones and the Fourth Amendment.  
Then, it discusses an emerging split among state supreme courts 
concerning compelled decryption.  Finally, it explains how magistrate 
judges are dealing with this issue, in practice.   
A.  Cell Phones and the Fourth Amendment: Riley v. California and 
Carpenter v. United States  
Riley v. California86 and Carpenter v. United States87 may appear like 
resounding victories for personal privacy in the modern era.  And in 
some ways the decisions are; the Supreme Court concretely recognized 
in both decisions that the cell phone is now almost a “feature of human 
anatomy.”88  Riley illustrated how the Supreme Court weighs privacy 
concerns in the wake of cell phones and that traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrine could not easily dictate the analysis.89  Carpenter 
continued this trend and also declined to apply previous Fourth 
 
 85 See id. 
 86 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 87 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 88 Riley, 573 U.S. at 385. 
 89 See id. at 385–91 (declining to extend Chimel and Robinson to cover cell phones). 
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Amendment principles to modern technology.90  But ultimately, it is not 
easy to discern how far these opinions go.  It would be easy to 
characterize both opinions narrowly, as courts have done.  This Section 
outlines the two opinions and highlights that while they may patently 
appear like victories for privacy, the two opinions leave far too many 
questions for lower courts to answer.   
1.  Riley v. California 
In 2014, the defendant in Riley v. California challenged the search 
of his smartphone incident to arrest.91  Riley showed that the Supreme 
Court recognizes that privacy concerns are more apparent in the wake 
of technological developments like these new minicomputers in 
everyone’s pocket.92  The case began with a traffic stop, where an officer 
discovered that the driver had been driving with a suspended license.93  
This prompted the officer to conduct a full search of the driver incident 
to the arrest, during which the officer seized the driver’s phone from his 
pants pocket.94  The officer went through the phone and found some 
indications that the driver was associated with the “Bloods” street 
gang.95  After an additional search of the phone, the officer discovered 
evidence linking the driver to a previously unsolved shooting.  The 
driver was ultimately indicted for the shooting and a related weapons 
charge, and in turn, found guilty of the crimes charged.  After the 
Supreme Court of California declined to hear the case, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.96   
The Court attempted to balance the privacy interests at stake with 
the legitimate government interest in solving crime.97  But the Court 
decided to depart from the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis 
because of the difference between physical objects, such as a car or a 
coat, and digital objects, such as photos and texts saved onto a phone.98  
Digital objects stored on a phone diminished the usual considerations of 
 
 90 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (declining to extend Smith and Miller, cases 
concerning the “third-party doctrine,” to the circumstances here). 
 91 Riley, 573 U.S. at 378.  This categorical exception to the warrant requirement 
allows for a contemporaneous search of a person incident to a lawful arrest.  See United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 92 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395, 401. 
 93 Id. at 378. 
 94 Id. at 378–79. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 380. 
 97 Id. at 407. 
 98 Riley, 573 U.S. at 400–01. 
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officer safety and evidence preservation.99  The Government failed to 
show, besides some anecdotal examples, that a normal arrest would 
prompt either consideration.100  Further, the suspect’s usual diminished 
expectation of privacy during a search does not apply to a cell phone 
search because a cell phone is much more expansive and includes “vast 
quantities of personal information.”101  Applying this framework, the 
Court held that the privacy issues presented by a cell phone and its 
contents outweighed the cost to law enforcement in preventing the 
search.102   
Notably, though, Chief Justice Roberts made clear that a search 
warrant could include the searched information (the contents of one’s 
phone).103  Additionally, law enforcement can use the same technology 
that creates this protection to obtain warrants quickly enough to protect 
the Government’s interests.104  Riley marked a transition in the Court’s 
treatment of technology and the Fourth Amendment.  Before Riley, it 
was unclear whether the Supreme Court was prepared to square Fourth 
Amendment precedent with digital information’s unique nature.  The 
Riley Court, with a near-unanimous majority, acknowledged that digital 
data deserves a different level of privacy protection than physical 
data.105  But just as quickly as the Court announced these principles, the 
Court included enough caveats to hollow out the opinion.106  
2.  Carpenter v. United States  
The Court followed up these lofty statements of just how intimate 
information on a cell phone is in Carpenter v. United States.107  There, the 
concern was over cell site location information (“CSLI”), which is 
effectively an imprecise GPS monitoring system.108  In 2011, officers 
 
 99 Id. at 405 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 100 See id. at 387–90 (majority opinion) (“[N]either the United States nor California 
offers evidence to suggest that their [safety] concerns are based on actual experience. . . 
.  We have also been given little reason to believe [remote wiping] is prevalent.  The 
briefing reveals only a couple of anecdotal examples of remote wiping triggered by an 
arrest.”). 
 101 Id. at 386. 
 102 Id. at 386, 401. 
 103 See id. at 401. 
 104 Riley, 573 U.S. at 401. 
 105 Id. at 400–01.  Justice Alito’s concurrence did express some doubt to the majority’s 
analysis; however, he appeared more concerned that the legislature needed to step in 
and dictate the proper protections.  Id. at 407–08 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 106 Id. at 401 (majority opinion) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information 
on a cell phone is immune from search . . . a warrant is generally required[.]”). 
 107 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 108 See id. at 2211–12. 
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compelled disclosure of certain telecommunication records for a four-
month period, during which a string of robberies had occurred.109  Using 
this information, officers were able to charge the suspect with 
robbery.110  On appeal, the question was if this data collection even 
amounted to a search under the Fourth Amendment.111  The Court 
ultimately found that collecting CSLI data did constitute a search and 
remanded the case to determine whether the search was reasonable.112   
Chief Justice Roberts harped on the pervasive role cell phones play 
in current society, as he did in Riley.113  Further, Fourth Amendment 
precedent is difficult to rely on because when these cases were decided, 
“few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its 
owner goes, conveying . . . a detailed and comprehensive record of the 
person’s movements.”114  Much like in Riley, the Court noted how 
technology has changed society and that these types of questions do not 
fit neatly into Fourth Amendment analysis.  Yet, what Carpenter means 
in practice is unclear, as the Court held that the vast amount of 
information obtained in Carpenter would not be allowed, but did not 
establish clear parameters for what would be allowed.   
On their face, Riley and Carpenter appear to be big shifts in how 
courts treat technology under the Fourth Amendment.  But, as discussed 
below, these opinions seem to be more narrowly interpreted and, as 
such, are seemingly more lip service than prescient protection.   
B.  The Fifth Amendment as a Source of Potential Resolution or 
Further Confusion? 
At the outset, it is important to note that while this Comment 
concerns the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has tried to clarify 
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are independent of each other.  
But often, a Fourth Amendment question implicates the Fifth 
Amendment as well.115  So, it is necessary to evaluate what protections 
the Fifth Amendment provides.  Thus far, only one state supreme court 
has determined if compelled biometric information is protected under 
 
 109 Id. at 2212. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 2211. 
 112 Id. at 2222–23. 
 113 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (Roberts, C.J.) (referencing his prior opinion in 
Riley, Chief Justice Roberts stated that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in 
modern society”). 
 114 Id. at 2217. 
 115 See Pardo, supra note 42, at 1858–59. 
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the Fifth Amendment, and that court ruled that it is not.116  As discussed 
below, lower federal courts have been inconsistent in this area.117  This 
Section looks at how courts have applied the Fifth Amendment to 
compelled encryption, as a general matter, for possible insight into the 
proper framework for compelled biometric.  In turn, this Section 
explains that the split only further complicates the analysis of compelled 
biometric passcodes,118 as demonstrated by a developing state supreme 
court split.  This Section concludes with some recent scholarship 
theorizing how the Supreme Court may rule on compelled decryption 
and what that may mean for compelled biometrics. 
States have begun weighing in on compelled decryption,119 starting 
from a Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts opinion, 
Commonwealth v. Jones.  These recent decisions are especially notable 
because they suggest that, as the split grows, the U.S. Supreme Court will 
review one of the decisions in the coming terms.120  This could lead to 
clarification on how compelled encryption is treated under the Fifth 
Amendment, and possibly some suggestions on how to analyze 
compelled biometric information.  But there are a few preliminary 
points to set forth before discussing the cases.   
First, state supreme courts have tried to answer two questions: (1) 
is the password testimonial, and (2) is the Government compelling an 
act to learn it?  If the password is testimonial and the Government is 
compelling an act to learn the information, the order would violate the 
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  If the act is non-
testimonial, then the clause is not implicated at all.  Further, if the 
Government already knows the implied speech, then the foregone 
 
 116 See State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. 2018) (holding that the 
defendant’s act of providing a fingerprint to unlock a cell phone was not testimonial 
communication).   
 117 See, infra, Section IV.C. 
 118 See Orin Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 
97 TEX. L. REV. 767, 768–69 (2019) [hereinafter Kerr, Compelled Decryption]; see also 
Kerr, A Dialogue, supra note 19. 
 119 Compelled decryption refers to when “investigators have a warrant to search a 
cell phone or computer, but they cannoy execute the search because the data is 
encrypted” by a password or passcode.  Kerr, Compelled Decryption, supra note 118, at 
768.  Then investigators seek a “court order directing a suspect to” enter the password 
to open the phone.  Id.   
 120 Prior to publication, the Supreme Court denied certiorari of an appeal from 
Pennsylvania.  Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 237 
(2020).  Before the denial, Professor Kerr suggested in a recent Twitter post that the 
Supreme Court will likely weigh in on this issue in an upcoming term but is likely looking 
for the right case to do so.  See @OrinKerr, TWITTER (Sep. 25, 2020, 2:19 AM), 
https://twitter.com/OrinKerr/status/1309379972356743168. 
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conclusion doctrine applies.121  Second, the split itself is not clear cut, as 
the bases for the four respective decisions differ.  Thus, it could be 
considered two related 1-1 splits, or one 2-2 split.122  This Comment will 
characterize the approaches by the four courts as two approaches: (1) 
the only implicit testimony when a suspect unlocks a phone is that the 
suspect knew the passcode, and (2) unlocking a phone implies more 
testimony than just knowledge of the passcode. 
Thus far, Massachusetts and New Jersey have embraced the first 
approach to compelled decryption.123  Under the first approach, a 
suspect’s testimony, presented by unlocking their phone, is limited by 
knowledge of the passcode, placing the compulsion under the foregone 
conclusion doctrine.124  Essentially, because the Government already 
knows the facts presented (the suspect knows their passcode), 
disclosing those facts does not force a suspect to incriminate 
themselves.125  This is because knowing the passcode does not reveal 
anything about the actual contents of the device.  Professor Orin Kerr126 
provides an example to illustrate this point: If a person knows their 
sibling’s passcode, they could comply with a court order to enter the 
passcode.  The only revelation from the passcode entry is that the 
person knows the passcode and can unlock the device.  Thus, the 
contents of the device are still only known by the owner of the device.127  
The only thing the Government needs to prove to force a suspect to 
provide their passcode is that the suspect knows the passcode and can 
access the device under the foregone conclusion doctrine.128   
 
 121 The Foregone Conclusion is an exception to the Self-Incrimination Clause.  
Generally speaking, it is when the information compelled “adds little or nothing to the 
sum total of the Government’s information.”  Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 
(1976).  In practice, if “the facts implicitly disclosed through the act of production are 
already known [by the Government], they are considered a ‘foregone conclusion’ and do 
not force a defendant to incriminate himself or herself.”  Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 
N.E.3d 702, 709 (2019).   
 122 See Orin Kerr, Indiana Supreme Court Creates a Clear Split on Compelled Decryption 
and the Fifth Amendment (June 4, 2020, 3:21 AM) [hereinafter Kerr, Split on Compelled 
Decryption], https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/24/indiana-supreme-court-
creates-a-clear-split-on-compelled-decryption-and-the-fifth-amendment.  
 123 See generally State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. 2020); Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. 2019).   
 124 Jones, 117 N.E.3d at 709–10.   
 125 Id. at 709. 
 126 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied on both Professor Kerr’s Law 
Review article regarding Compelled Decryption and Professor Kerr’s amicus brief in its 
2019 decision.  See id. at 711 (citing Kerr, Compelled Decryption, supra note 118). 
 127 Kerr, Compelled Decryption, supra note 118, at 779. 
 128 Jones, 117 N.E.3d at 710.   
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in applying this 
framework, held that because the state created a strong inference that 
the defendant knew the phone in question’s passcode, compelling the 
defendant to open the phone did not violate the Fifth Amendment.129  
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held similarly and added a key 
criticism of the split’s other side.  The Andrews court noted that the other 
side of the split essentially conflated compelling production of the 
passcode with the act of producing the contents, which imports Fourth 
Amendment privacy principles into a Fifth Amendment inquiry.130  
Then, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the only compelled act 
of production is producing the passcodes, those passcodes have little to 
no testimonial value, and this production fits squarely within the 
foregone conclusion doctrine.131   
The second view introduces an additional consideration: unlocking 
the phone not only indicates knowledge of the passcode but also 
recognizes that unlocking a “phone is a gateway to a treasure of 
potential evidence.”132  The Indiana Supreme Court and Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania have supported this approach.133   
The Indiana Supreme Court found that the documents produced 
are inherently linked to the compelled production of the passcode.  In 
turn, the passcode creates two analogies: “First, entering the password 
to unlock the device is analogous to the physical act of handing over 
documents. . . .  And second, the files on the smartphone are analogous 
to the documents ultimately produced.”134  So, any time a suspect is 
compelled to unlock their phone, they communicate three things: (1) 
they know the passcode, as suggested in the first view; (2) evidence is 
on the device; and (3) the suspect possesses that evidence.135  The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania focused less on the consequences of the 
 
 129 Id. at 720. 
 130 State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1271, 1274–75 (N.J. 2020).  It is important to 
note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey “views the protection against self-
incrimination as incorporating privacy considerations.”  Id. at 1277.  
 131 Id. at 1274 
 132 Kerr, Split on Compelled Decryption, supra note 122; see also Laurent Sacharoff, 
What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX. 
L. REV. ONLINE 63, 68–69 (2019) (explaining the slippery slope that opening a phone 
creates). 
 133 See Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. 2020); Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 
A.3d 534, 545 (Pa. 2019) 
 134 Seo, 148 N.E.3d at 957. 
 135 Id.  
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compulsion than on the compulsion itself.136  The court held that 
requiring a suspect to recall and then disclose a memorized password 
reveals “the contents of one’s mind,” and so the password is testimonial 
in nature.137  While the two courts had different rationales, they reached 
the same conclusion that a passcode reveals more than just the fact that 
the suspect knows the passcode. 
As mentioned before, the law surrounding compelled decryption is, 
quite bluntly, a mess.  It is tough to reconcile that the first approach 
ignores the practical effects that compelling a passcode’s production 
reveals.  But it is equally difficult to ignore that the second approach is 
not directly rooted in current Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.  Further, 
as Professor Kerr posits in a recent article, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision on this matter could turn on the choice of these 
characterizations.138  Accordingly, there is little benefit to parsing 
through this muddled analysis to find the parameters for compelling 
production of biometric features.  In fact, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania made sure to note that its decision did not address 
biometric features.139  As a result, what is left is essentially a blank slate 
for magistrate judges, which has exacerbated the unclear mix of 
approaches.   
C.  The Principles in Practice and Magistrate Judges’ Inconsistency 
After Riley and Carpenter, it remains unclear how biometric 
passcodes fit into current Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.  
The Supreme Court in Riley outlined just how vital privacy protections 
are to individuals and the information on their phones.140  Looking to 
recent state Supreme Court opinions on compelled decryption only 
complicates matters.141  And while the Fifth Amendment seems to 
provide the best protection in accessing a person’s phone, so long as an 
 
 136 See Davis, 220 A.3d at 545.  This situation is partially a mess because courts that 
tend to come to the same result are analyzing the solution from different analytical 
frameworks.   
 137 Id. at 548.   
 138 Orin S. Kerr, Decryption Originalism: The Lessons of Burr, 134 HARV. L. REV. 905, 
960 (2021) [hereinafter Kerr, The Lessons of Burr] (“If compelled entry is treated as akin 
to compelled production, then it may be barred by the Fifth Amendment.  If compelled 
entry is treated as akin to admitting knowledge of the password, then the rules for 
compelled entry should match those for compelled disclosure of the password.”). 
 139 Davis, 220 A.3d at 550 n.7 (“[W]e need not address the related, but distinct, area 
involving biometric features like fingerprints, thumbprints, iris scanning, and facial 
recognition, or whether the foregone conclusion rationale would be appropriate in these 
circumstances.”). 
 140 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).  
 141 See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
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individual strictly uses a numerical passcode, that could change with a 
potential Supreme Court decision on the issue.  But, as this Section 
shows, the Fifth Amendment was not designed to protect an individual’s 
privacy, and this protection’s shortcomings are evident in recent 
magistrate opinions and the inconsistent analysis of this issue.  The 
magistrate opinions analyzed in this Section present three approaches: 
(1) applying the Fifth Amendment in place of the Fourth Amendment; 
(2) applying the Fourth Amendment but focusing on solely the scope of 
the warrant at issue; and (3) a hybrid of the two. 
1.  Applying the Fifth Amendment in Place of the Fourth 
Amendment 
Two recent opinions highlight the imperfect fit that relying on the 
Fifth Amendment in lieu of the Fourth Amendment creates.  Both 
opinions ignored any privacy concerns and instead focused on whether 
a fingerprint is compelled information.142 
First, on review of a magistrate decision, the District Court for the 
District of Idaho overruled a magistrate judge and held that the 
biometric information sought was a “physical characteristic.”143  
Regardless of the decision, the issue was that the magistrate judge 
focused on and whether or not the fingerprint was a “compelled 
testimonial communication.”144  This approach eliminates any 
consideration as to whether compelled production of biometric 
information amounts to a reasonable search.  Further, as compared to 
Supreme Court and federal circuit precedent, a fingerprint can be 
justified as a non-testimonial act, as the district court judge noted in the 
court’s holding.145  
Second, in United States v. Barrera, the magistrate judge quickly 
discarded any Fourth Amendment concerns because the warrant was 
more limited than the usual challenges, and so did not address the 
Fourth Amendment.146  The challenge, much like the one in In re Search 
of a White Google Pixel 3XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, concerned 
the Government’s attempt to unlock a suspect’s phone using his 
biometric information.147  The analysis the Barrera court used is 
 
 142 See In re Search of a White Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398 
F. Supp. 3d 785 (D. Idaho 2019) [hereinafter Google Pixel]; United States v. Barrera, 415 
F. Supp. 3d 832, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 143 Google Pixel, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 793. 
 144 Id. at 790.   
 145 See id. at 793–94.   
 146 Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 835, 835 n.1. 
 147 Id. at 833–34. 
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notable.  The court assessed three considerations in evaluating the Fifth 
Amendment protections: (1) whether biometric information is closer to 
a key than a combination; (2) whether biometric information is more 
physical than testimonial; and (3) whether the implicit inferences from 
the biometric information can be considered testimonial.148  Following 
precedent, the court found clearly established that a fingerprint is more 
analogous to a physical key, especially in the context of using a 
fingerprint to open a phone.149  Additionally, the court found that 
because a suspect is not reciting any words and the Government is 
dictating the compulsion, the process used none of the suspect’s 
thoughts.150  Finally, the court found that the information provided by 
compelled production of biometric features was not enough to warrant 
the implicit inference of identifying the phone as someone’s property 
because up to five different fingerprints can be programmed.151 
The magistrate judge also explicitly referenced Riley v. California 
and summarized why the magistrate could not rely on the Fifth 
Amendment for privacy protection.152  The court recognized that old 
analogies are not nearly as applicable as they once were; however, there 
is no Fourth Amendment protection under typical Fifth Amendment 
analysis, and Riley never addressed these same privacy concerns.153  
Therefore, the court found that any broader interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment would diminish the purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
because limiting access to evidence is squarely within the Fourth 
Amendment’s parameters.154 
This type of analysis is not limited to just these two courts155 and 
shows how easy it can be to justify compelling production of a person’s 
biometric information via the Fifth Amendment.   
2.  Applying the Fourth Amendment  
In re Search of is one of the few cases that considers the Fourth 
Amendment in its analysis.  The warrant at issue sought “any” evidence 
in cell phones and computers found upon the premises.156  This included 
 
 148 Id. at 838–39. 
 149 Id. at 839. 
 150 Id. at 840. 
 151 Id. at 841. 
 152 See Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 842. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See, e.g., United States v. Maffei, No. 18-CR-00175-YGR-1, 2019 WL 1864712, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019) (holding that compelling the defendant to unlock their phone 
via biometric information did not violate the Fifth Amendment).   
 156 In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 525–26 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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any devices that “reasonably could contain evidence of the offenses 
under investigation.”157  The Government also sought an order 
permitting law enforcement officials to unlock any device within the 
scope of the warrant through the use of biometric passcodes.158  The 
Government argued that obtaining an individual’s physical 
characteristics does not infringe on their Fourth Amendment rights 
because compelling production of these characteristics is not an 
intrusion upon the individual’s privacy.159   
The court set forth a standard to analyze this issue and noted that 
there should be a nexus between the Government’s evidence and the 
device trying to be searched.160  The court held that the Government may 
compel the use of biometric features to unlock a device if there is 
reasonable suspicion the suspect committed the crime, if the procedure 
is “carried out with dispatch and in the immediate vicinity of the 
premises to be searched,” and if there exists reasonable suspicion that 
the suspect’s biometric information will unlock the device.161  The court 
found all of these elements present and concluded that the Government 
could compel the use of biometrics to unlock any devices found at the 
premises.162   
This case is interesting because the magistrate judge appeared to 
reinforce the principles presented in Riley v. California, but then upheld 
a warrant that allowed the use of biometrics for any device.163  The 
conclusion seemingly counters the principles set forth by the magistrate 
judge. 
3.  A Hybrid Approach Using Both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments 
These opinions each contain a muddled analysis.  The through line 
in the analyses is that these courts recognize the protections that the 
Fourth Amendment and Riley afford but ultimately rely on the Fifth 
Amendment in their conclusions.   
First, in In re Search Warrant Application for [redacted text], the 
district court disagreed with the magistrate judge, who had held a 
warrant application unconstitutional because the warrant required any 
individual present to provide fingerprints to unlock any device 
 
 157 Id. at 525. 
 158 Id. at 525–26. 
 159 Id. at 529. 
 160 See id. at 527–28, 528 n.3. 
 161 Id. at 533. 
 162 In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 540. 
 163 See id. at 533, 540. 
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discovered.164  The court relied on Touch ID’s time-sensitivity, noting 
that waiting could lead police to be unable to unlock the phone using 
Touch ID through several ways, such as a 48-hour wait period since last 
unlocking the phone, someone remotely locking the phone, or the phone 
turning off and being restarted.165  After balancing the interests at stake, 
the court found that compelling the use of biometrics was reasonable.166  
Further, the court noted “the intensity of the privacy interests at stake 
in accessing smart devices,”167 and found that “although Riley certainly 
instructs courts to avoid mechanical application of legal principles in the 
face of technological advances, the constitutional text dictate[d]” 
upholding the warrant.168   
But the court, confusingly, did not rely on the Fourth Amendment 
in its conclusion and explicitly did not address it.169  Instead, the Matter 
of Search Warrant court upheld the warrant because the compelled 
production of biometric information was not self-incriminating under 
the Fifth Amendment.170   
This hybrid approach has led to inconsistent results, as a similar 
case with similar analysis led to the opposite conclusion.  In In re 
Residence in Oakland, California, the Government sought a warrant to 
seize electronic devices and “to compel any individual present . . . to 
press a finger . . . or utilize other biometric features.” to unlock those 
found devices.171  The court in this case also noted the breadth of the 
information sought and that any search would need to be much more 
limited to comply with the Fourth Amendment.172  In its Fifth 
Amendment analysis, the court disagreed that using a fingerprint to 
unlock a device was akin to fingerprinting in the booking process for 
two reasons.173  First, the fingerprint here replaced a passcode; 
therefore, the fingerprint should be treated as a passcode because they 
are functionally equivalent.174  Second, compelling someone to use their 
fingerprint on a device served to identify the owner of that device.175  
 
 164 See In re Search Warrant Application, 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 801–02 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 165 See id. 
 166 Id. at 806–07. 
 167 Id. at 806. 
 168 Id. at 806–07. 
 169 Id. at 807. 
 170 In re Search Warrant, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 807. 
 171 In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013 (N.D. 
Cal. 2019). 
 172 Id. at 1014. 
 173 Id. at 1015. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 1016. 
VAYAS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2021  10:42 AM 
1662 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1639 
This, in turn, exceeded the physical evidence created when someone 
submits their fingerprints for booking.176 
A biometric feature is used “to access a database of someone’s most 
private information.”  For this reason, it is closer to “physiological 
responses elicited during a polygraph test,” which are protected under 
the Fifth Amendment.177  In deciding this case, the court emphasized, 
relying on Riley v. California, that mobile phones are inherently different 
devices and should have stronger protection.178  When law enforcement 
officers open a phone, it likely contains significantly more information 
than anticipated.  Therefore, it could not be subject to the foregone 
conclusion doctrine.179  This case illustrates many of the principles that 
guided the Riley decision; however, these principles came in the form of 
a Fifth Amendment protection. 
This muddling is exacerbated as more courts rely on these very 
decisions and create a starker split, further showing a need for 
guidance.180  For example, in United States v. Wright, the District of 
Nevada held a warrant unconstitutional by relying on In re Residence in 
Oakland, California.181  But, another opinion—relying on the same cases 
and reasoning—found a similarly constructed warrant constitutional.182   
V.  MOVING FORWARD 
Riley v. California established that the modern smartphone is more 
similar to a home than a telephone because of the immense amount of 
private information contained in it—thus, smartphones deserve 
increased protection under the law.183  Carpenter v. United States 
confirmed the U.S. Supreme Court’s peculiar approach concerning these 
devices.  But now, the implications of these two cases and their broader 
applicability are unclear, as exacerbated by the state supreme court split 
regarding compelled decryption.  Lower federal courts have attempted 
to apply the Fifth Amendment, but there are some analytical gaps 
inherent in using the Fifth Amendment in place of the Fourth 
 
 176 Id.  
 177 In re Residence, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1016. 
 178 Id. at 1017. 
 179 Id. at 1017–18. 
 180 Compare United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188 (D. Nev. 2020) 
(holding that a warrant violated the Fifth Amendment by relying on the aforementioned 
cases in this Comment), with In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 539–40 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(upholding a warrant, relying on the same cases).  
 181 Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1188 (citing In re Residence, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1016). 
 182 In re Search of, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 539–40. 
 183 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394–97, 401 (2014). 
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Amendment.184  Therefore, a few questions stem from biometric 
information’s inclusion in search warrants: (1) are courts giving the 
privacy considerations outlined in Riley the proper deference; (2) what 
provides better protection, the Fourth or Fifth Amendment; and (3) 
which amendment should be used, and why? 
A.  Privacy Considerations in Riley 
First, the Framers created the Fourth Amendment to prevent 
arbitrary and unreasonable searches.185  Riley establishes that absent 
“exigent circumstances,” the Fourth Amendment protects cell phones 
from warrantless searches.186  Further, the sheer amount of personal 
information contained on cell phones creates a need for additional 
protection.187  Therefore, there should have to be a compelling reason to 
grant law enforcement access to such an intimate device.  Otherwise, as 
Justice Scalia188 and Professor Amar suggested,189 the freedom from 
unreasonable searches provided in the Fourth Amendment will be 
irreparably distorted.  
Modern cell phones contain a multitude of intensely personal 
information that may or may not be related to the crime being 
investigated; therefore, digital data deserves an increased level of 
privacy protection.  It can contain someone’s entire life.  The ability to 
access this information needs to be reasonably limited to prevent law 
enforcement from abusing their power.  Based on Riley and Carpenter, 
there appears to be support for this proposition.190  Chief Justice Roberts 
made clear that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in 
modern society.”191  Accordingly, the Court refused to apply the third-
party doctrine to cell phones and their data and instead used a more 
protective approach.192  But in both Riley and Carpenter, the Court made 
sure to show just how narrow the opinions were.193  Consequently, 
 
 184 See supra Section IV.C. 
 185 See Amar, supra note 24, at 773, 776–77; Michael, supra note 23, at 921–22. 
 186 Riley, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014). 
 187 Id. at 386, 407. 
 188 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 189 Amar, supra note 24, at 801. 
 190 See supra Section IV.A for a discussion on Riley and Carpenter.   
 191 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).  
 192 Id. 
 193 See id. (“Our decision today is a narrow one.”); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 
373, 402 (2014) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is 
immune from a search[.]”). 
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lower courts have flouted these considerations in favor of deference to 
governmental interest.194  
B.  What Offers the “Better” Protection 
The Fourth Amendment, as demonstrated above, provides little 
protection to the inclusion of biometric information in search warrants.  
Therefore, defendants have most successfully relied on the Fifth 
Amendment to protect biometric information against unlawful 
seizure.195  Among just the opinions explicitly mentioned in Part IV, five 
ruled that the inclusion of biometrics in a search warrant was 
reasonable, and two ruled their respective warrants were overbroad.196  
Among the five that ruled that there was no constitutional violation, 
three did not address the Fourth Amendment or its protections.197  Even 
when a court found a Fourth Amendment issue, it ultimately relied on a 
Fifth Amendment violation to deny access to the evidence sought.198   
But in light of recent decisions, both on the state and federal level, 
the Fifth Amendment’s reliability in compelled biometric information is 
now in doubt.  The recent state supreme court split will likely compel 
the U.S. Supreme Court to evaluate the Fifth Amendment’s protection to 
compelled decryption.  Professor Kerr suggests that any ruling on this 
issue would be a close call and depends on a choice of analogies.199  
Further, this seemingly minute distinction between the characterization 
of what law enforcement seeks to compel can be dispositive in 
practice.200  And while only one state supreme court has weighed in on 
compelled biometric information, the court ruled the Fifth Amendment 
does not protect biometric information.201  So, while the Fifth 
Amendment may initially appear as providing the best protection, it 
 
 194 See, e.g., In re Search of [Redacted] Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 533, 540 
(D.D.C. 2018) (agreeing, after balancing some factors, that the government interest 
outweighed the defendant’s and upheld the warrant). 
 195 See supra Section IV.C. 
 196 See id. 
 197 See supra Sections IV.C.2, IV.C.3. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Kerr, The Lessons of Burr, supra note 138, at 960 (“If compelled entry is treated as 
akin to compelled production, then it may be barred by the Fifth Amendment.  If 
compelled entry is treated as akin to admitting knowledge of the password, then the 
rules for compelled entry should match those for compelled disclosure of the 
password.”). 
 200 See supra Section IV.B.   
 201 See generally State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018); see also supra 
Section IV.B (discussing a recent state Supreme Court split regarding compelled 
decryption).   
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would be difficult to trust it will remain a viable option to challenge 
compelled biometric information.   
C.  Lower Courts Are Improperly Relying on the Fifth Amendment  
While possibly disappointing from a civil liberties perspective, the 
lack of constitutional protection for biometric information seems 
logical.  The Fifth Amendment provides an imperfect framework to the 
question.  The Supreme Court has never applied the Fifth Amendment 
to prevent the use of evidence that “did not involve compelled 
testimonial self-incrimination,” 202  meaning that the Fifth Amendment 
is definitively not intended to protect personal privacy.  The Supreme 
Court has held that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections may 
overlap in what they protect but has not addressed why they overlap.203  
The overriding concern of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent compelled 
self-incrimination, while the Fourth Amendment protects privacy 
interests.204   
Using the Fifth Amendment to protect biometric information has 
been somewhat successful; it is apparent, however, that lower courts 
have struggled with the fit.205  In In re Residence in Oakland, CA, and 
United States v. Barrera, as discussed above, both courts relied on the 
same principles to justify their respective holdings but reached opposite 
holdings.206  Just because the Fifth Amendment may overlap with the 
Fourth Amendment in the scope of their protections does not mean that 
one amendment can be substituted for the other.  The split in Residence 
in Oakland, CA, and Barrera demonstrates courts’ confusion when 
substituting the Fourth Amendment for the Fifth Amendment in 
analyzing the use of biometric information in the process of a Fourth 
Amendment search.   
Further, the magistrate judge in Barrera referenced that a broader 
application of the Fifth Amendment creates a murky constitutional 
framework, and in turn, undercuts the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment.207  The Fourth and Fifth Amendments serve distinct 
purposes, and muddling the two renders them redundant.  Because of 
this redundancy, if a challenge in this line of cases reached an appellate 
 
 202 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). 
 203 See id. at 400. 
 204 See id. 
 205 See, e.g., United States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 206 See id. at 839 (holding that biometric information was more akin to a key and not 
testimonial); In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F. Supp. 3d, 1010, 
1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764–65 (1966)) 
(holding that biometric information can establish guilt and was testimonial). 
 207 See Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 842. 
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court, it is unclear if that court would even consider privacy concerns in 
applying the Fifth Amendment.208  But the Framers created the Fourth 
Amendment for this type of challenge.  It was enacted to prevent the use 
of general warrants that allowed law enforcement officers to search a 
person and uncover something incriminating during the search.209  
Analyzing the inclusion of something in a warrant is better suited for the 
Fourth Amendment despite the lack of success in these challenges.  
As the magistrate in In re Search Warrant Application suggested, 
there needs to be some clarification to this framework.210  Determining 
whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment should not hinge 
solely on the inclusion of biometric information in a warrant but on 
whether, under the particular circumstances, the search itself is 
reasonable.  As Professor Amar argues, reasonableness is the linchpin of 
the Fourth Amendment, not a warrant requirement.211  This 
reprioritization of reasonableness would allow Fourth Amendment 
doctrine to keep pace with technological advancements.  In its current 
formulation, briefly assessing whether a search warrant application 
included biometrics (assuming the relevant court chooses to apply the 
Fourth Amendment) ignores a commonsense evaluation of the search 
and its reasonableness.212  Accordingly, this focus on the Warrant Clause 
and current reliance on the Fifth Amendment is another example of how 
courts have weakened the protections the Fourth Amendment 
provides.213   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Riley v. California established a need for some departure from the 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in a warrantless search of a cell 
phone and held that exceptional circumstances were required to search 
the cell phone in that case.214  A similar level of rigor is also necessary 
when law enforcement officers apply for a warrant that includes 
biometric information.  Cell phones are much closer to a computer than 
the traditional phone they once were.  Further, even something as 
 
 208 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) (stating that absent a self-
incrimination compulsion challenge the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable). 
 209 Michael, supra note 23, at 912. 
 210 See In re Search Warrant Application, 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 211 See Amar, supra note 24, at 801 (“The core of the Fourth Amendment, as we have 
seen, is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.”). 
 212 As Professor Amar argues, “[T]he Court’s obsession with warrants, probable 
cause, and criminal exclusion has often made it difficult for the Justices to admit what 
common sense required.”  Id.   
 213 See supra, Section IV.B. 
 214 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400–01 (2014). 
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simple as the means to open a phone frequently changes.  But lower 
courts’ analyses have failed to fully embrace this idea.  
Relying solely on a probable cause standard or the Fifth 
Amendment dilutes the language of the Fourth Amendment and 
subverts its original purpose—reasonable searches.215  With that in 
mind, courts should consider if someone’s face or fingerprint should be 
used to open something that could contain the equivalent amount of 
intimate information that a person’s home does.  Thus, in the absence of 
clarification from the judiciary or Congress, courts should not compel 
the use of biometric information for just any warrant, as they routinely 
do.  There should be a particularized device, person, and purpose in the 
warrant, and a nexus demonstrating the link between the need for the 
biometric information and the crime investigated.216  Further, courts 
must more stringently consider the privacy implications at issue.  
For that reason, until this issue is clarified, magistrate judges and 
district courts need to ensure search warrants are properly tailored.  
There should be a clear nexus between the search warrant, the device 
implicated, and the crime investigated to avoid the dangers the Fourth 
Amendment was enacted to prevent.  Instead of rubber-stamping 
biometric-inclusive search warrants, it is necessary to ensure the search 
is reasonable—avoiding further dilution of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections and purpose.   
 
 
 215 See Amar, supra note 24, at 776–77. 
 216 See In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 
2019). 
